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A ruse is a gimmick or device used as a strategy or instrument. For
Foucault, method can best be understood as a ruse rather than as a method
which promises truth. Methods regulate what can be discovered and the
discourse about what can be discovered In this essay. the realist and idealist
models of method are criticized from Foucault's perspective. Both models
rely on some transcendental reality which -. from Foucault's perspective--
are constructed by the practices ofresearch itself. Even though Foucault
rejects foundational assumptions, he does have a method which has its
homogeneity, its systematicity, and its generality. Foucault's method is
outlined, discussed, and related to similar methods. Finally, Foucault's
critics are notedand answered
Method in most social science is built on either the realist or the idealist
model of epistemology (Smith 1983; Smith and Heshusius 1986). The realist
model assumes a social reality independent of the knower that can be know if
only the knower can be divested of values. that is. if the knower can be
objective. Thus, the realist utilizes randomization. blind tests. the null
hypothesis. the separation of the researcher from the subject. and numerous other
devices practically to force a separation of fact and value in the practice of
knowing. Claims about social reality which do not utilize such practices are
criticized as being conditioned or biased by the values. emotions, or interests of
the knower.
The idealist model assumes that knowing cannot be separated from the
knowing subject. Regardless of practices used to separate the knower from
..so~r~es of .bias, the knower always actively selects theories. methOds.- and
interpretations. Thus, fact can never be separated from value. For the idealist.
one uses one's own capacity for understanding to anempt to understand the
meaning that others give to situations. Since the subject in the only one who
can confirm or modify a researcher's understanding of the subject. the
independence of the subject and the knower from coercion is fundamental to the
process of intersubjective Understanding.
Both the rcaslist and the idealist models represent a solution to Kant's
question, "What is enlightenment?" (Kant 1963). As Gutting (1989) notes:
His ramous answer was that enlightenment is man's release from his
"inability to make use or his understanding without direction rrom another:
an inability that was to be overcome by finding the courage to use onc's
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, ari~, th.e existe?ce of a? independent reality provides a point of comparison and
ar~Jlr?tlon against. which contradictory statements about the reality can be
adJudicated. By uSlDg ~e .appropriate procedures, one should be able to develo
and rcfi~e laws of ~s~latlonand causal laws which are isomorphic with realit/
While the reahst vle~ of social scien~e posits a distance between the knowe~
an~ the k.nown, .Foucau.lts (1979) analySIS of the application of discipline in the
prison revcals Immediately that the neutral. objective relation between the
k?ower ?nd the kno~n assumed by the realist model rests on devices such as
hlerarc~lc~1 .observatlon, the panoptican, and the examination. The neutrality
and objectIVity assumed is created by these asymmetric devices Thus th
not neutC?1. .S!mi~arl~, Emerson (1988) exposes this use of pc;wer reiati:~sa:
creatc objecll~lty m hIS analysis of the emergence of self-consciousness in field
w~rk. Colomal regim~ in which much early field work was conducted was
budt on the power relatIOn between the colonial rulers and the native population
The power ?~ the ruler guaranteed access to and cooperation from the natives:
Thus, co~dlllons could be manipulated to test hypotheses. The power and
cultu~1 differences be~ween the colonial researcher and the natives provided the
exteno~, detached. sU~Jc:cts necessalj' for the construction of the appearance of
n~utrahty a?d objectIVIty. Yet, thiS again. is hardly a neutral situation In a
I dlff~rent velD, Dunc~n (I ~84) notes that most methods of measurement' in the
\ reah~t model of sOC:lal sCience have their social roots in methods of voting! levYI~g taxes, va!ulDg goods, labeling social ranks, bestowing honors, and
r drawlDg lots. ~galD, al! ?f.these are rooted in nonneutral. asymmetric relations.
r .. A second hne of cn~lcls~of the.realist model can be drawn from Foucault's
) crluque of the foundauonahst notIon of an independent. knowable reality.
'I C~ke (1993a) o~s~rves that, while Foucault avoids solipsism by the minimal
reah~m of recogDlz~ngso~n:es of recalcitrance and asymmetries set up by other
practl~es, Foucault IS unwtllmg to privilege any model of reality as true because
there IS no way to separate knowledge from the asymmetries of the practices used
10 find trut.h. For example. Alwin and Krosnick (1985) observe that the ranking
o~ values IS altered by the use of a rating or a ranking methodology Is the
difference. they f~und rooted in the method, did they discover two different as ts
cOf a reality, "llelther;or 'bbth'r Hhhcnnvai'iififaspect locaied in the ':01
t c~n~tructed to produce a measure or in some reality independent of the tool?
.. Similar ques!ions .can be raised about Smith's (1987) finding that attitude~
tOhward a public polley change when survey respondents are asked questions using
t e word "poor" inst d f" If: ". . ea 0 we are. One can describe the apparatuses and
'0 :Slstance Involved i~ social action and the consequences associated with those
.": pparatu~es a~d r~slstance. But, can one claim a truth transcendent of this
, codetermmed situation?
.: A th~r~ .line of criticism of the realist model is suggested by Foucault's
:::. ~~980~ cntlclsm ?f global, t~talitarian theories. The realist model assumes that
;:; ere .IS. one, uDlvc~sal reah~y that one can discover and reduce to laws of
::: association or causation. While t~ese global theories have provided useful tools
,ror loeol rese.rch. 'he very noUon of globO) ,heories forces all local. non·
l. 49
own reason ramer Iban submil il 10 books, paslors, physicians, and other
external authorities.
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The aim of the realist model (Smith 1983; Smith and Heshusius 1986) is to
match one's descriptions of the world to the actual conditions of the world.
Here, Ibere is an independent source of reality against which one's models can be
judged. In order for a knower to successfully carry out the role of observer of an
independently existing reality.lbe knower must be neutral. That is, the know~r
must eliminate all bias and preconceptions, must not be emotionally involved m
Ibe knowing process, and must use value-free, neutral language. Devices used to
insure and measure reliability, internal validity. and external validity are
procedures used to eliminate bias and preconceptions. If contradictory statements
A Critique of the Realist and Idealist Epistemologies
Mid-American Review ofSociology
The realist slJ'ategy to make use of understanding without direction from another
is to develop and use practices Ibat eliminate the influence of emotions, values,
and interests. The idealist strategy to make use of understanding without
direction from another revolves around strategies to give equal standing to the
intelpretations of the subject being studied, the researcher, other researchers, and
the reader of the research product.
Foucault (1965, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1980, 1982a, 1982b, 1984, I988a,
1988b, 1988c, 1990a, 1990b, 1991a. 1991b) has rendered both of these
perspectives problematic by showing that the objective nature of the real and the
independent. meaning giving nature of the subject are both built on particular.
historical practices d1at are not power neutral. In other words, the very slJ'ategies
used by the realist and the idealist models to make use of understanding without
direction from another are in fact replete with effects that direct.
The purpose of this work is to critically evaluate the realist and idealist
approaches to research method from Foucault's viewpoint and to outline
elements of Foucault's own approach to method. First, the realist model of
research will be elaborated and criticized with respect to the model's assumptions
of a neutral, objective relation between the knower and the known, an
independent source of reality against which one's models can be judged. a
universal reality. a unique mapping of reality, of causality, and the
correspondence theory of trUth. Then, the idealist model of research will be
elaborated and criticized with respect to the model's assumptions of a
tranSCendental subject as giver of meaning and a transcendental ethical subject.
After criticizing traditional approaches to research method. Foucault's anti-
foundationalist assumptions will be discussed. Even though Foucault rejects
foundational assumptions, he does have a method which has its homogeneity. its
systematicity, and its generality. After elaborating Foucault's method and
relating it to the grounded theory approach to qualitative research and the
..... ' .. ,_parti~i~t9.r)'.JlCJ!C?~~!! __~~~oach to the study of organization~,Fo~c~ull'.~,
critics wall be noted and answercu.
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centralized practices either into a common mold or discounts them as accidental I created by !~e researcher in order to reduce potentially important differences into
and therefore inadequate. com~onahtles. Such reductions further become a priori judgments which
One way the ideal of universal reality is operationalized in realist models is restnc~ the field of consideration of the researcher. While it is never possible to
through sampling theory. The traditional sampling approach assumes that a set know If one has enumerated all elements of a practice. normal social science
of practices would be distributed in a nonnally distributed fashion. There are presupp~ses such a possibility. Furthermore, the categories are probably not
statistical test for testing this assumption. Basically, these tests are devised by present In the thought of the individuals whose concrete behavior is to be
conslructing a nonnally distributed population. by drawing a random series of understood on their bases. FinaJly. definitions. categories. and rationalities are
samples of a specific sample size. and by developing a distribution of a specific all parts of practices whose power effects can be understood only by relating
parameter such as standard deviation. These tests assume a condition and use it them to other elements of practices.
to construct a conditional statement: If the population is nonnally constructedt In the place of essential reduction, Foucault (1991 a, 1991b) encourages one
then any sample of a given size should fall within a given parameter with a to break down practices into their elements. While one attempts to ••saturate"
given probability. Even though every student of logic and scientific method the break down and while the elements can be taken as finite. one can never
knows that this scheme guarantees nothing because the converse of a conditional presume to know that the break down is complete. Furthennore. the breakdown
statement is not necessarily lrUe, the practical use of the test is to rely on the is a c~nstruction ~f the researcher. Thus. one cannot claim to exhaustively or
truth of the converse. Unless one can survey all practices over all time under essenlJally categonze some reality.
consideration. one is left with the assumption of the nature of the distribution of ~~cond. ideas of causality in naturally occurring settings rely on the
practices. Thus, with sampling, explanation -- a theory about the nature of the cond~tJ.onal statement and on some accounting of covariation. As noted earlier,
population - precedes discovery and establishes -- Le., governs •• the discourse condillonal st~t~menls only give one the ability to reject some theorized
about it. nec~sary condItion.. They cannol be used to actinn necessary conditions without
A second assumption of traditional sampling is that one has the apparatus I relymg on the pracuce or arfinning the converse of the conditional which is a
available to obtain a random sample. That is, it assumes that one has the power . fallacy ~ithin the di~c~urse of conditional stalements. When it is applied to an
to gain access to get a sample which is representative of the population as_ accountmg of covanallon. the slope becomes even slicker. Whether one uses
Iheorized. However, if one is studying an organization. one will be embedded in I~:'. cross classification. correlation, regression. faclor analysis, or some other
numerous practices which direct. block. and reorganize that to which one can ~ me?Sure of covariat~on, t~e procedure forces a reduction of phenomena to the
gain access. For example, a company that Cooke (l993b) studied employed a vanables under conSideratIon and constructions an accounling of variation in the
management consulting firm to survey all of the employees in the organization. dependent variable in tenns of the currency of the independent variables.
To get the surveys completed. the company had to require as well as to . To demonstrate the indeterminacy of conjecturing relations between
encourage employees to take the survey. In response to this, he found that vanables and then usi ng covariation to demonstrate the relation, consider
several employees cooperated 10 answer questions the same to "send a message" ; Cooke·s (1992) examination of the relationship between relative cohort size of
to management. Others collectively decided to answer neutrally to "hide" in fear persons in an internal labor market and the rate of survival of members of a
of the consequences if they revealed their true feelings. So. the tactics adopted : cohort in an organization from one time period to another. Cooke used Reed's
by the respondents rendered the tota.l pop~lation survey ~roblematic by . t'; (197~) findings ~at ~n individua~'s chances .for prol!l0t}on .a~~~really' aff~Jed.~y ...
introducing totally unknown characlenstlcs-mtothe'populatlon from ...those··~·· .;.'.. -'lclUIJVe-Cohort size In a system In which aU promotions are made from within
theorized. Here, no a priori construction of the population could have included ~. and in which few leave for other employment to predict that, as the ratio of
the practices actually used by workers because the workers devised the prdctices. ': y~u?ger t? older clergy rises. the number of younger clergy remaining in the
in response to the survey. .. (minIstry 10 the next period will decrease. When Cooke examined this
A fourth line of criticism of the realist model can be constructed by t relationship for all members of the Oklahoma Annual Conference of the
contrasting Foucault's anti-essentialist, "polymorphousll approach to correlation Methodist Church who were in the ministry from 1940 to 1980, he found the
with the essentialist. exclusive partitioning approach to causality..First. t~e .. : pr~~icted linear relationship between relalive cohort size and survival in the
nonnal way of doing social science relies heavily on the requirements trom logic.' '.' ministry that accounted for forty-four percent of the variation in the proportion
that reality be partilioned into mutually exclusive categories based on an :\ ofclergy surviving to the next period. However, when he considered only clergy
essential aspect of the phenomena under consideration. This might be done ,': I·:: who were actually in the internal labor market of the annual conference
t
the
through such devices as idealty~~ (Weber (1958) 1978)•.categories (Strauss. . . ~;,. predict~d linear relations.hip only accounted .for one percent of variation in the
1987; Channaz. 1988), or defintllons (Best 1981; Babble 1986). Fo.ucault ,.:"".;: proportion of clergy survlvmg to the next penod. So, by changing definitions ••
~991b) criticizes such a panitioning and reducing because such categones"1.;~t,llYhIChwere all mutually exclusive within their scheme - one came up w::
~.r.Pi
• I
I
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descriptions. choosing 10 honor some as valid because they 'make •. .
•. . .. I .", . sense, gIvenn~e ~ 1l1.ler~SI~, ,'~1~ purposes. (Sm.. th and HeshuslUs. 19K6:9). If one applies the
alms 01 the re,'hst. Illodel to ..deal 1st methods -- whIch are methods designed to
gel at the meaning of th.ngs as the other sees it -- one subverts Ihe
indeterminism of Ihe idealist epistemology with the determinism of realism.
The realisl requirements of isomorphism hetween data and an independent reality
is imposed on Ihe idealist model such that the cOl]etennimltion of interpretatiun
is hrnken apart into suhject and ohject. Now. interpretations can he judged hy
~111 isomorphism hetween the researcher's interprelation and the suhject's
interpretatiun. Fur example. Agar (1988) and Den7.in (1983. 1989a. 198%)
propose that the v~llidity of interpretations can he determined hy suhmitting the
interpretations 10 review hy those being studied or hy using the interpretations as
a rule hook to ~lI1ticipate interaction with the suhjects heing studied. Another
stmtegy for hreaking apart the codetermination of the interpretation with realist
assumptions is analytic induction (Agar 1986; Denzin 1989h). Here, one creates
an interpretation. checks it against further examples of the behavior under study,
modifies the interpretation, checks it against more examples of hehavior. and
continues until the interpretation can account for all behavior and until no further
examples can he found which would counter the interpretation. As Smith and
Heshusius (1986) argue, the application of a realist set of rules for determining
truth to a set of procedures which do not assume an independent reality force the
creation of an independent reality and force the separation of the. true from the
false on the hasis of that independent realily rather than hy "honoring" some
interpretations and not others as "making sense."
The idealist model of research (Smith 1983; Smith and Heshusius. 1986)
docs not posit a strict separation of the knower from the known. It does not
posit an independent reality which can be know by a neutral observer. Instead.
Ihe idealist epistemology recognizes that the object of study is not known apart
Irom the knowing subject. What is known is a product of the mind with its
attendant emotions and values. There is no independent reality availahle as an
arhitrator of interpretations. The process of understanding involves a constant
movement with no heginning or ending. Since the viewpoint of the other in
social context is the ohjeet of study, one attempts to understand the meaning that
_ others.ghfe to U!cir situaHons...J:lere, .truthcalt ()J1Ly_ be understood as a socially _
and historically conditioned agreement. With no external reference, two
conlradictory interpretations arc simply different ways of constituting reality.
Agreement is reached through a process ofjustification that is inescapahly hound
up with values and interests. All one can do is match interpretations to other
intcrprct~llionsand choose to honor some as valid because they make sense given
one's interests and purposes. There arc no rules or procedures to produce truth.
Before moving to criticize the idealist epistemology from Foucault's
perspective, it is important to note that Foucault and the idealist epistemology
hoth sec phenomena as constituled in a codetermined fashion with the act of
knowing. Thus. hoth are unwilling to engage in claims of procedures which
offer 10 produce truth independent of the practices of knowing. In this way, they
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different resulls. While the discourse of causality would cause one to begin to
look for other variables, one is always left in the position of not knowing if one
has enumerated all elements or if one has appropriately related the elements as
one forces the accounting of variation into the enumeration one has created with
a discourse about causation which claims more than it can ever deliver.
In the place of allocating causality on the basis of classification and
variation accounting, Foucault (19913, 1991b) relies on exploring the inlerplay
and relation of elements of practices and how they posit and work on things
actions of others, and relations with oneself. For example, Foucault (1975'
1991a) notes that a medical object that was positioned on a surface c1assificatio~
is mapped out in the three dimensional space of the body after the beginning of
the nineteenth centuIY.. The body only becomes a thing to be acted on when it is
appropriately identified by a practice. In the practice of discipline (Foucault,
1979), movements become elaborated and codified. Actions can only be acted on
once they are elaborated and embedded in a practice. In the confession (Foucault,
19903), the confessor can only work on a subject once a generalized "desire" has
been attributed to the subject.
Once one has identified the elements of a practice and the things, actions of
others, and relations with oneself related to the elements of a practice, one can
explore".•• the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces,
strategies and so on which at a give moment establish what subsequently counts
as being self-evident, universal, and necessary" (Foucaull 1991b: 76). Foucaull
intends to substitute this necessarily incomplete exploration of dependencies
among elements ofa practice and how they posit and work on things, the actions
of others, and relations with oneself for the activity of allocating causality. By
~oing so, Foucault does not claim a better argument for causality. Instead, he
Intends to explore how practices work while suspending the privilege of arguing
cause.
A fifth line of criticism of the realist model is suggested by Foucault's
(1980 1984) analysis of truth. As noted earlier, the realist model is buill on the
correspondence theory of truth. Here, there is a source of reality against which
contradictory models can be judged and which can be known by using methods
whiob-guarantee-objeetivity'8lld neutrality. However, Foucault claims that·truth·
is II • • • a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, r:
distribution, circulation, and operation of statements" (Foucault 1980: 74). it
Truth is what is produced by a set of rules and procedures. That is, the rules for (
producing truth have a power effect by governing which statements are:
acceptable or unacceptable (Foucault 1984). ~
To see how the assumptions of the realist position have an effect on ~
governing the acceptability of statements, consider Smith and Heshusius' (1986) , I
~alysis ofh~w at~empts to adopt realist concerns to idealist methods subvert the . ~
81m of the Ideahst epistemology. Since the idealist model of knowing ;.~ecognizes that.the mind ~i~ i!s atte.ndi~g e!."otions and intentions is involved ~~
an the construction of reality 10 JDvesugahon, IOquiry can only be a never ending . ~
:-'of i__. "Aillhal cao be done is 10 maIch descriptions 10-;;".1
...•..~:::':'-~::"::]{~",~~
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both break the social and rhetorical power of truth claims rooted in the realist
epistemology.
Having recogniled this affinity between Foucault and the idealist
epistcmology. therc arc significant and critical differences betwcen them. First.
the subject or mind exists for the idealist as a real. transcendental reality that acts
to give meaning. As such. it is an unmoved mover which can be an object of
study (Cooke. I993a). Thus. Denzin (1990) notes that underneath the textual
orders created by social scientist. journalist. or novelist. there is the subject -
the man. woman. or child -- who has her or his words and stories to tell. Here,
the researcher aims to see the world of a group as a member would see it. to
learn the meaning of actions from the viewpoints of members. and to portray
these as accurately as possible (Smircich 1983). As noted earlier, the r.lain
congruence set up by this scheme is between the interpretations of those studied
and the interpretations of the researcher (Jones, 1983). Against the
transcendental subject, Foucault (1990a) argues that the subject is constructed by
techniques used to elicit hidden truth drawn from the confessional. As Denzin
(1990) observes. the meaning of experience is in its telling. Such meaning
itself eludes the teller and listener. But. as Foucault (19903) notes, the telling is
elicited by specific techniques and in specific relations of power. The telling
itself elicits further interpretation and emotions by the listener and by the teller
after the fact The transcendental fiction called subject is an artifact posited by
techniques or rituals of relating and by the myths about the situation. Thus,
Foucault encourages one to examine the relations, rules. and techniques for
interacting rather than subjects themselves to understand what people do and how
they do it
In addition to the subject as the transcendental author of meaning. the
idealist epistemology contains a concept of the subject as a transcendental ethical
subject For example, Denzin (1990) posits the right of the subject to interpret
his or her own story. Habermas (1984) posits an equal right among story
tellers. Yet. Foucault (1980. 1984) argues that such rights arc a part of
technologies of sovereignty. While the king gives up certain rights with the
concept of natural rights, natural rights ensnare actors in asymmetric devices
such as contracts. bureaucracies, and different methods of voting. Rather than
constructing a place of freedom to act, natural rights are techniques of governin~.
In addition, Foucault (1980, 1984) objects to concepts of power grounded 10
sovereignty because they entirely miss technologies of power deriv.ed fr~m
techniques of discipline or confession. For example. I as a researcher nught give
sumeone who was a subject a right to review my interpretation to see if in fact I
understood her or him. Yet, if one were to actually examine the interaction
during the review, one would see all sorts of accounts, postures, a.nd gesture~ on
the part of both of us as we struggled over an acceptable. IOterp~etatlOn.
Furthermore. life in organi7.ations is replete with the asymmetries of hierarchy
and dividing practiccs. I might give both a worker and a manager a chanc.e to
review interpretations. Both would probably work to eliminate interpretations
which make them look b'ld or which reveal strategies that they arc trying to keep
54
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hidden. The worker hilS much less ahility to keep her or his interpretations from
managers .- who must often engage in studies -- than the manager has tn keep
her or his inlerprclatiuns from workers. Thus, asymmetries of power which are
lutally missed hy Ihe concept of rights have an effect lin the construction or
interprelatinns. All uf Ihese lechniques for rclilting do serious dillllilge to the idea
of a lranscendental suhject so crilieal 10 mernhership validillion and In validalion
Ihrough recognitiun ami honoring.
III sOllie of Foucault's Iilte interviews (Foucault I982a. 1982h), leclures
(Fnucilult 198Xa. 1988c; Miller 1993). and bonks (FtlUC;lUIt. 1988b. 1990h). one
nnds evidence Ihat could suggest that Foucault may hilve ;It least assumed a
tmnscendental suhject in his new interest in the self. As Miller (1993) accounts
Foucaull's Howison lecture at Berkeley, Foucault admils that he may have
overly persisted in his reliance on techniques by which others work on the self.
~Ie could now sec the importancc of techniqucs that enahle persons to work on
their own bodies. souls. thoughts. and conduct to transfonn themselves, modify
themselves. or act in a state of perfection or happiness. "Perh'lps in a differcnt
kind of world. with a different set of techniques for approaching the self. a
human being might no longer feci compelled to punish itself •• and 'sacrilice'
itself -- in order to hccomc what one is" (Miller 1993:324).
Yet. a closcr reading of a fcw passages from these later works suggest that
Foucaull is not giving credence to the conccpt of a transcendental suhject with
his emphasis lin the art of cxistcnce. On the onc hand. the art of existcnce for
Foucault (1990h) means intcntional and voluntary actions by which people seck
to transform their livcs into a work that carry certain aesthetic values and
stylistic criteria. In the first part of this formulation, a person is acting
"intentionally" and "voluntarily" in the currency of the transcendental subject.
Yet. in the second part of thc formulation. one is engaged in a practice that
contains values and criteria. The practice itself is a device that is not power
neutml. Practices involved in the art of cxistcncc are "modes of suhjectivation."
They mark out a substllnce for which one cares. They arc modes by which "...
the individual estahlishcs his relation to a rule and recognizes himself as ohliged
to put it to work" (Foucault 1990b:27). There is "cthical work" that one
performs on oneself to comply with rules and to transform onl?self into .the
I' ethical' subject of one's behavior. Foucault makes it plain in an interview that
he docs not see the Grcek alternative analyzed in thesc later works as an
alternativc which would libcrate the self from self-incurred tutelage (Foucault
I982a:23I ):
No! I am not looking for an altcrnative; you can't find the solution of a
problem in the solution of another prohlem raised at another moment
by other people. You sec. what I want to do is not the history of
solutions, and that's thc reasons why I dun~t accept the word
"alternative." I would likc to do genealogy of problems ... , My
point is nut that everything is h'ld. hut that everylhing is dangerous,
which is not cXilctly the smnc as had.
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A ruse is a gimmick or device used as a slralegy or instrument. For
Foucault. method can best he understood as a ruse rather than as a method Which
promises truth. In fact. trulh from Foucault's viewpoint is produced by rules and
relations for separating or dividing statements into the true or the false. The
rules and relations of the idealist and of the realist epistemologies are disciplines
and as such tame and nonnalize as surely as does discipline applied to prisoners.
Truth itself is a ruse in the game of powerlknowledge.. By recognizing truth in
this way. foucault (1984:46) is able to raise his principle question: "How can
the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensilication of power
relations?" Because of his allempt to explore the capabilities in social practices
without resorting to the power effects of truth about those capabilities,
Foucault's method has been called an anti-method (Shiner 1982). As Keeley
(1990) notes. Foucault is not interested in theorizing or in hypotheses. Instead,
Foucault encourages a researeher to adopt an altitude of contestability, to apply
analytic devices, and to explore possibilities.
In addition to bracketing the issue of trulh with the use of ruse as method,
Foucault adopts other strategies which are designed to unhinge the realist and
idealist frameworks of trulh. First, Foucault (1984) concenlrates on specific
instances with historical investigations in order to separate out from the
contingencies that which makes us what we are and what we are no longer
capable of being. By focusing on the historical and the specific, Foucault
intends to reject the search for formal Slruclures with universal value. Second,
Foucault (1980) encourages one to concentrate on practices, that is, to
concentrate on how things work at the on-going point of application. By
focusing on practices, Foucault intends to reject inquiry at the level of conscious
intentions or decisions. Third, Foucault (1980) encourages one to begin the
analysis of power at the local level in the application of various practices to
things, to the actions of others, and to actions on one's self. Only then can one
condu'lt. an ..~,e~d.i.~g ~nalysis. by exploring how local practi~es are-invested,
colonized, and utilized by other practices. By focusing on the infinitesimal
applications of techniques of relation. Foucault intends to rejcct an exclusive
focus on large, centralized mechanisms as an explanation for phenomena. While
Foucault (1980) encourages one to begin with the infinitesimal and then explore
their colonization in an ascending analysis of power, Donnelly (1982) observes
that Foucault fails to follow his own advice by showing how technologies such
as discipline in the prison are analogous to the industrial setting without actually
tracing the process of diffusion. Finally, Foucault (198() claims that one cannol
achieve a perspective for fully knowing our historical limits. Theoretical and
practical experience is always limited and determined. With no independent
reality or transcendental subjcct which can be used as a measure, one is always in
the position of beginning again. While each new study with realism and
JMid-America" Review ofSociology
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idealism represents a new approximation, each new litudy with method seen as
r~Jsc rcpr~sents .. nc~ perspective. By recognizing method as perspective.
hmcllult mtends tn rCJcct the foundational assumptions of idealism and realilim.
Even th~lUl:!h Fou.cault rejecls foundational assumplions. he (Foucault
19X4:47) clUlIllS thai hIS lIpproach to method docs not mean Ihllt "... no work
CllJl he done exccpl in disorder and contingency." His method has its
homogeneity. ils syslcmalicity, and its genemlity.
By homogencily. roucaull (1984) means that one sludies what people do
and how Ihey do it. In order to do this. Foucault examines pmctices as if they
wcre Icchniques or devices. For example, one could look al a practice as if it
were an l'pplmllus (Foucault 1980). That is. one could look at a pmctice as
hcing an ensemble consisting of discourses. institutions, archilectural forms.
regulalory decisions, law, administrative mea,<;ures. scientific statements, moral
propositions, etc. Then. one could try to identify the nature of the connections
that can exist hetween the clements. Finally. and to the point. one could explore
how these clements and their relation to each other set up or discourage certain
lines of behavior. Foucault deals with this last point by claiming that an
apparatus has a strategic function (Foucault 1980) or is conditioned by strategy
jusl as the apparatus also conditions strategy (Foucault 1990a). For this reason.
Donnelly (1982) has crilici7.ed Foucault for engaging in functional arguments or
in denying but requiring a transcendental subject to give meaning. However. as
Cooke (1993a) demonstrates, if one stays on Foucault's horse and attends to the
a.'iymmetries in the apparatuses involVed in practices. one can explore differential
outcomes set up by practices without resorting to functions or needs or without
nceding a transcendental actor with a purpose. Another way Foucault explores
how practices work is to focus on discourse with the idea of the epi..,reme
(Foucault 1972; 1980). The episleme is the apparatus which makes possible
the separation of what may be taken to be true from that which may not be
characteri7.cd as true. Again. one is interested in exploring what discursive and
non-discursive elements are related in what way to separate statements taken to
he true from those not taken to be true.
By systematicity, Foucault (1984) identifies three broad areas of practical
~sysle"!s: rel~tions.of <:ontro! over things. relations of actions upon others, and
I, relations with oneself. For example, wltti"respect to constituting ourselves asmoral agents of our own actions. Foucault (1984. 1988a. 1988b.1990a. 1990b)hegins by looking at what part of the self or action is conceived as ethical
sub!'itance. He then moves to explore modes of subjection by which people arc
invited or incited to recognize moral obligations and mean!'i by which people can
change themselves in order to become ethical subjects.
Finally, by gencmlity. Foucault (1984:49) means that his investigations are
spccilic and "... bear upon a material. an epoch. a hody of determined praciices
and di!'icourses .. ." that "... have continued to recur up to our time ... ."
Here, Foucault (1990a) is not only interested in identifying and analyzing
!'ilralegic unitie!'i. he is interc.<;ted in examining critical changes which renect a
revcrsal of relationships of forces. Since such a reversal is a complex
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. .. ... research arrrnach to the ~tudy () organtzatlons (yte ). As with
restructuring of apparatuses. It must be descnbed co~paratlv~ly. ~hus. l~cwert : Fnucaull. grounded Ihenry begins hy examining what is going on and looks for
and Gillan (19K2) ohserve that Foucault structures hiS text wIth a then and a wfmt c.m he t1elined and discovered mlher than hy deducing a hypothesis from
"nnw:' First, Lcwert and GiI!an. (1982) note that. Foucault hcgi.ns every text and thenry ami then testing it with data. Since one docs nol know in advance in
most sections with the descnptlon of an exceptional case wh~ch anchors what !!rcmndetl thenry cx.lctly what nceds to he smnplcrJ. nne explurcs. analyzcs
follows. For example. in Discipline mId Punish, Foucault hegans the book with through developing theorctical categorics and the rel,.tiunships hetween those
the description of a torture and execution as a case to a.nalyzc the technology of calcguric.'i. ami then uses theoretic••1gaps to decide wlmt needs 1o he smnplcd next
punishment used by the king. Foucault (Lewert and GII~an 1982) th~n employs In extend ami fill in Iheory development. In a similc.r rashion. FClUCClUIr
un oppositive structure -- e.g., then ... now -- to orgamze a comparison of the encoumges nnc lo hegin by exploring where and how things are made
two different apparatuses that m~rk th~ reversal of relationship of forces. This prohlematic. However. he has a framework for exploring the prohlematic. What
comparison aids in the exploratIOn 01 the apparatuses and how.they evoke or practiL:es Llrc involved in making things problematic? What substance do they
inhihit different lines of action. Again. in Discipline a"d PUlllsh. Foucault's crcate lind work on'! The actions Hf others? The self! Things? Bow do they
analysis of the use of punishment on the body of the condemned then is wurk on them"! What lines of action are encouraged or discouraged'!
compured with the emergence and application of techniqu~s of discip.Jine fourthermore, Foucault encourages one to expand thc enumeration of c1er~cnlsor
borrowed from the military. the school, and the church and applied to the.pn~on practices and relations among them rather than using categories as deVices for
IIOW. He finally explores how social science could emerge from the application collapsing distinctiuns. While theory development drives sampling in grounded
of discipline to a confincd population but could not emerge with thc use of theory. Foucault would recognizc that a researcher works in a set of practiccs.
punishmenl on the hody of the condemned by the king. Thus: Foucault's So. practices implicit in the setting which make things. prohlem~tic d.rivc
analytic is applied to analyze how one set of apparatuses are dlsplaced by sampling. Different groups are on the receiving end or applymg cnd 01 practices.
another. . . They experience them as problematic from these different angles. The practices
The method used hy Foucault contains at least seven pOints of praehce. themsclves dose or opcn access to viewpoints and sellings.
First. Foucault (1984) encourages one to focus on wha~ people do a~d how they With the participatory action re.c;carch approach, one actively works with
do it. In order to examine practices, Foucault (1980) views them as If they were members of an organi7.alion throughout the research process. Like Foucault. onc
techniques or dcvices. Second, to identify practices, Foucault (1980. 1984) hegins by discovering the problematic in an organi1.ation. The viewpoints of
encourages one to explore how Ihings are made problematic. Third, Foucault actors arc not avoided but used 10 construct the picture of what is occurring.
(1984) encourages one to explore what suhstances the practices p?sit and .work Unlike Foucaull. one tests perceptions with memhers of organi1.ations. in
on as a praclical system. Specifically, Foucault .contcn.ds that practices P~Slt and pmticipatory aclinn research to clarify perceptions. For Foucault. such testmg
work on things. the actions of others. and relations with on~sel.f. Additionally. involves organizational practices that must be explored rather than transcendental
Cooke (1993b) has observed that relations themselves are objectified and worked actors that can be relied on for verification. In participatory action research, one
on by social practices for constructing relations~ips.. Fourth. Foucault (199.13, develops with memhcrs of an organi1.ation a strategy to address Ihe prohlematic
1991 b) encourages one to break down practices Int~ th~ elements whIch through such a process. In other words, the research strdtegy itscl f can help to
constitute them. Thc number of such clements are not glven In ~dvance hut ~an 'set up a new line of cooperative hehavior. Foucault himself was very much
be taken to be finite. Thus. "one has to proceed by progresslve, necessanly 'inlerested in exploring practices with an eye to new ways of acting. However,
incomplete saturation", (~nucault 19910:77).. fifth, FOI~cault (I~9I,a. 1991 b) . -~unlike participatory tlction research. the articulatioh of a set of values or social
cnCOUrdges one to identify the nature of the connections that can eXIst among the . policy __ such as cooperation _ probahly inhibits effective political and elhical
elements and the lines of activity they sel up or inhibit For Foucault (1~91.b). action from Foucault's (Gandal 19R6) viewpoint. Since all practiccs arc huilt on
prdctices have roth prescriptive effects rega~ding what is to be done and codifying a~ymmetric apparatuses. all practices arc dangerous. While Whyte's (1991)
clTccts regarding what is to be known. Sixth•. Foucau~t (19H4: 1991a, !99Ib) analyses of several casc studies of participatory action research focused on two
encourages onc to examine critical changes In practices whlc~ constitute a . potentially connicting groups coming together in cooperation, such approaches.
reversal of relationships o~ force. Sinc~ such a rev~rsal IS a complex while selling up new lines of cooperation, represent potential dange~ to the
restructuring of apparatuses, It must be deSCribed co~paratlv~ly. ~~us. ~mert union or 10 managemcnl. For example, Banks and Metzgar (19R9) descnhc how
and Gillan (1982) observe that Foucault structures hiS text With a the~ and a p.1rticipatory stnltcgies used by management to set up cooperation can he used to
"now." Seventh. Foucault (1979,1980. 1984) encourages one to examme how appropriate shelp Iloor knowledge and, in doing so. continue the process of
practiccs circulate and arc colonized by other practice.~. ;" deskilling workers. There are no utopiiln solutions.
Foucault's approach is similar to both the grounded theo.r~ approach. to }
qualitntive research (Strauss 1987~ Charmaz 1988) and the participatory ncllon
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Research method is a ruse. It is an apparatus which regulates whal is
~ discovered and the discourse about what is discovered. If one adopted the
: traditional realist stmtegy of reviewing literature. deducing hypotheses. and
'_,- crcaling and implementing a research design to answer a series of yes or no
:;- questions, one would have to know the apparatuses used in a setting and the.
~ distrihution or those u'pparatuscs.. On"c 'would also have to use a series of devices
;' to reduce aclors to ohjects and to conlrol the scene in particular ways. It' is
; highly unlikely that such power and control would be available to a researcher in
~, a natural setting. Since Foucault recognizes that the realist perspective sets up
i. potential conclusions clOd limits alllJther views before one ever begins a study,
rhe encourages one to explore socia: practices at the point at which they are made
'; prohlematic. This docs not mean that one is engaged in a method which avoids
\ regulating discovery and discour.ie. It simply means that one cannot know what
~. practices exist and how they are heing made prohlematic hefore the facl of
; exploring the practices.
~. Since Foucault's analysis leads one to ser aside method as an establisher of
::trurh in i.ny foundatinnalist sense, what is the point of any description o( method
'.
purpose is caused hy good reasons. However, good reasons arc parts of
apparatuses ~md arc thcmselves replete with a.~ymmetries which encourage certain
, lines of aclions HruJ discourage others. The only way thai power c.m he separatcd
(mm the ilsymmclries of iJpparaluses is 10 locate a principle of decision making
in some essence which is not modified hy the apparatuses hy which distinctions
nrc mitde ilnd fly which aClions are executed. This is exactly wtmt FOUCilU1t
refuses In dn. By f()cusing on sochll practices. Foucault fenders actors. purposes.
acls. and scenes in tenns uf agency or means (Cooke 1993a).
Realists aHack FoucilUlt's epislemology hy pointing oul that practice
implies a reality scpamte from the praclicc. Margolis (1986) noles thatlhere can
he no practice without a recognition of a feafity within the life of a practice.
One is always sCilrching for the nccessary within the contingenl. Shapiro (1990)
points out that science assumes a causal mechanism that operates independent of
lour ahilily to perceive it. Bhaskar (1986) observes that there are thrce levels of
reality: the real. the actual. and the apPllrenl. While our rc.~earch practices affect
what is apparent. there is a reality lhat makes it possible to refine the efforts of
our research praclices to more accurately approximate the real. Unlike the
. realists. Foucault is unwilling to privilege any piclure of reality ac; lrue because
there is no way '0 separate knowledge from the practices used to estahlish it
At the same time. Cooke (l993a) has pointed out that Foucault at least avoids
~ol;psism by the minimal realism of recognizing sources of rccalcitrance clOd
asymmetries set up by other practices. While one cannot claim a reality separate
~ from the apparatuses used to establish it as the realist would have one do. onc
. can usc Foucault to describe the apparatuses involved in practices and the
, consequences a'iSociated with those praclices.
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Foucault's method not only represents an approach to explore how social
practices work. but it also represents a ruse or.gimmick for.soci~1 criticism. The
method of social criticism for both the realasts and the Idcahsts rcsts on the
traditional dichotomy of fact and value. The reali.slS separat~ ~act and .value and
ultcmpt to construct a value frec picturc of what IS real to critique claims based
on value. Herc. value is disclaimed while the picture of the real ~Iays the role of
value. Idealists tend to collapse fact and value in thc act of knowmg and thereby
reduce criticism to the rhetoric and politics of claim making..
With the ruse of the genealogy of power. Foucault combanes fact and value
through two differcnt understandings of the term power. On the one hand.
Bemdtson (1970) used the tenn power to esscntially mean cause. ~ower is know
in and exercised at the point of surmounting change and resistance. The
appearance of permanence is created by overcoming thc novel from moment to
moment. On the othcr hand. Cooke (1990) has argued that pow~r can be
understood as a moral category. Within the t~chnology of sovere~gnty, the
exercise of power implies the use and abuse of nghts. Thus. power IS a moral -
problem which requires remedies to redress wrongs. ., -
By combining these two senses of ~ower: Foucau!t IS Simultaneously
engaging in social criticism as he engagcs m SOCial analys~s: <?n the o~e hand, ,
Foucault (1979) is simply dcscribing how enclosure. part.ltl.omng. codl~g: a~d
ranking constructs the individual as an object. By exammmg ~ow actiVity 10
controlled through the use of time tables. the temporal elaboration of acts, the
correlation of the body and gesture. the exhaustive use of the body and acls. and a
system of signaling commands, Foucault is simply describing an ensemble of
elemcnts and how they encourage and regulate certain actions. On the other
hand. he is describing the tools by which power is ~xercised on people: to?ls
that expose and ensnare actions. tools than rank and Judge. and tools that entice
the ncxt action. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982: 81) note. rules o~er~te
simultaneously for Foucault as descriptive regularities and as presCTlptlVe
operative forces.
Foucault's perspective has been criticized by many. Most of these
criticisms rely on cither the realist model, the idealist ~odel, or both. Fr~!1'. the
idcalisl ~rspective of the meaning giving subject, Gldden~ (19~4) CrHIClleS
Foucault for turning the subject into an epiphenomenon of the tacllcs of power.
Taylor (1984) criticizes Foucault for attributing st~tegic p~uems to a context
without attributing such strategic patterns to anyone s consc~ous plan: Bhaskar
(1986) points out that actors intentionally create contexts which contal~ both the
intended and unintended consequences of the actor such that the strategic pauer~s
of the actor could continue through thc strategic patterns of the context even In
the absence of theactor."
BUI. in a critique of Taylor. Patton (1989) notes that Taylor's concept ~,f
power is build on the exercise of power while Foucault's con.cep! of power IS
built on capacities. Patton demonstrates that power as capacity IS prtor to all
other senses of power. In the tradition of the idealist modcl, Giddens, Ta~lor,and
Bhaskar, rcquire purpose to motivate actors. In fact, Bhaskar (1986) clatms tha,t
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al all'! Firsl, to look ut a set of practices using Foucault's approach is 10 apply a
systematic research device. So. a description of method can be rendered.
However. the method makes no claims to truth. Second. even though Foucault
continues his efrort to unhinge the truth claiming business of method by
avoiding extensive documentation of his research (Lewert and Gillan 1982).
documentation is an importanltechnology for constituling trust in the secondary
rc(utionship or agency between the researcher and the reader. While a description
of gathering and disseminating information does not generate truth in any
foundational sense. Shapiro (1987) notes that they do provide the reader with the
conventions hy which the study was done so the reader can evaluate the work
done hy the researcher. In other words. a description of method is a disclosure.
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